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Summary 
The question of who has a "right to know" what about a publicly held cor-
poration has emerged in the discussions of the Study Group on a number of 
occasions. At the moment it may be said that the law does not appear to 
recognize any general, unqualified right to information about the affairs of a 
corporation. There is an obvious trend under stock exchange regulations and 
SEC pronouncements toward requiring full and prompt disclosure of all ma-
terial facts and events relevant to the financial position of a corporation; but, 
at least in the case of the SEC developments, the focus seems to be as much 
on preventing unfair trading advantages for insiders as on validating anyone's 
right to know. Developments with regard to information about nonfinancial 
matters, such as protection of the environment and minority employment prac-
tices, are very much in a state of flux; but there does not appear to be any re-
quirement that corporations disclose such data unless it is financially relevant.1 
* This paper was submitted to the Study Group on the Objectives of Account ing 
in August 1972. Footnote one was added subsequent to that date. 
1 The fol lowing discussion does not deal with the question of whether stockholders 
by an appropriate vote can compel management to disclose non-financial informa-
tion. In recent years a number of stockholder proposals for disclosure of information 
about corporate activities in areas of public concern have been made under SEC 
Proxy Rule 14(a)-8; and while none of these proposals have attracted widespread 
support, they have dramatized the increased interest of the investing public and 
society at large in the matter of corporate societal responsibility. For an excellent 
discussion of this subject, together with the related topics of shareholder efforts to 
compel broader disclosure through actions to inspect corporate books, and interroga-
tion of management at the annual meeting, see Blumberg, "The Public's 'Right to 
Know': Disclosure in the Major American Corporat ion," The Business Lawyer, Vol. 28 
(1973), p. 1025. 
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Financial Information 
The starting point for any analysis of this topic is SEC Rule 10b-5, which 
expressly forbids misrepresentation or other deception in connection with the 
purchase or sale of any security, and is viewed as impliedly requiring affirm-
ative disclosure of all relevant information. The entire thrust of federal securi-
ties legislation, as well as the express reference to purchase or sale of a 
security in Rule 10b-5 [and in section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 under which the Rule was promulgated] indicates that Rule 10b-5 is 
primarily directed at financial information which would be relevant to existing 
or prospective investors (including, without further delineation herein, many 
types of creditors). Section 13(a) of the 1934 Act seems to be to the same 
effect, in requiring every issuer of a registered security to file with the Com-
mission such information and reports as the Commission may require "for the 
proper protection of investors and to insure fair dealing in the security" 
(although perhaps the Commission could find support in this broad language 
for compelling disclosure on a broader front if it chose to do so). Accordingly, 
in thinking about whether and when there may be a right to know, it seems 
useful to look first at financial information, and consider later other types of 
data relating to an enterprise. (However, it must be kept in mind that any 
dichotomy along this line is far from clear-cut; for example, even if it is 
assumed that general information about a firm's impact on the environment 
is outside the normal bounds of financial data, certainly a clear prospect of 
liability under existing antipollution legislation would be relevant financial 
information under the most traditional standards.) 
To take the polar case under Rule 10b-5 first, there is no doubt that 
insiders (including the corporation itself) and their tippees must disclose any 
relevant nonpublic financial information they may have to existing share-
holders before purchasing shares from them. But notice that this result may 
rest entirely upon the notion of fair play on the part of insiders toward the 
stockholders they are supposed to be serving, and does not depend upon 
any general right to know on the part of stockholders. However, in view of 
the reference to sale as well as purchase in Rule 10b-5 it was perhaps 
inevitable that the Rule would also be applied to sales of stock (despite 
the serious technical obstacle that finding a civil remedy for buyers under 
Rule 10b-5 seems inconsistent with the express but somewhat qualified 
remedies for injured buyers under sections 11 and 12(2) of the Securities 
Act of 1933). Finding liability to a buyer, of course, takes Rule 10b-5 beyond 
the confines of fair play on the part of insiders to existing stockholders, as 
does applying the Rule in the case of a misrepresentation by one who is not 
an insider (although that may be rested simply on the traditional legal pro-
hibition against affirmative misstatements). 
A more testing question as to the scope of Rule 10b-5 comes when 
one who is not an insider (whether he acts as buyer or seller) is guilty of 
mere nondisclosure, as distinguished from an affirmative misstatement (or a 
half-truth). Under common law principles, there was doubt whether any 
obligation to speak arose in an ordinary arm's-length transaction, absent 
some special relationship such as that of a fiduciary to his beneficiary. Hence 
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the construction of Rule 10b-5 (which, it should be recalled, does not ex-
pressly require disclosure except where necessary to prevent something that 
has been said from being misleading) to require disclosure by insiders to 
selling stockholders might have been premised on the view that the relation-
ship between insiders and stockholders was "special,"—quasi-fiduciary— 
leaving intact the common law insistence on some special relationship as a 
condition for requiring disclosure; and this indeed was the early view of 
Rule 10b-5. But the more recent developments indicate that the courts are 
moving in the direction of finding that Rule 10b-5 requires disclosure of any 
material, nonpublic information (except perhaps the product of a person's 
own effort or imagination) by any buyer to his seller, or vice versa. Even so, 
query how constructive it is to think of this as a right to know on the part of 
the complaining party; it may be as aptly thought of as a localized version of 
the abolition of "caveat emptor" in favor of "caveat vendor." 
Much more consistent with a general right to know on the part of in-
vestors is the growing trend toward requiring publicly held corporations "to 
make prompt and accurate disclosure of information, both favorable and 
unfavorable, to security holders and the investing public." Sec. Act Release 
No. 5092 (October 15, 1970) was expressly reaffirmed by the Commission in 
Sec. Act Release No. 5263 (June 22, 1972). Release No. 5092 emphasizes 
that this obligation is not satisfied merely by fulfilling the periodic reporting 
requirements to the SEC (including the required reporting of important events 
within ten days after the end of the month in which they occur); the company 
"still has an obligation to make full and prompt announcements of material 
facts regarding the company's financial condition." The disclosure policies 
of the various stock exchanges are in the same vein. For example, the New 
York Stock Exchange's "Policy on Timely Disclosure" starts with the follow-
ing statement: "A corporation whose stock is listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange is expected to release quickly to the public any news or informa-
tion which might reasonably be expected to materially affect the market for 
securities."2 
What is the authority for this requirement by the Commission and the 
Exchanges of prompt public disclosure? Of course the Exchanges have the 
power to promulgate reasonable rules governing the conduct of the com-
panies whose stock is listed thereon; and the Commission's Release seeks 
to draw some support from that, expressly referring to the "rules and direc-
tives of the major exchanges" embodying a "policy of prompt corporate 
disclosure of material business events." But the real enforcement arm here, 
potential civil liability, is more likely to flow from violation of SEC rules and 
regulations than those of the stock exchanges (although the possibility of 
suspension from trading or delisting by an Exchange must be kept in mind), 
so the Commission's posture becomes the most important one. In any event, 
note that this broad, general disclosure requirement goes beyond the scope 
of Rule 10b-5 as discussed thus far, for it is not confined to situations where 
2 New York Stock Exchange Company Manual, A-18; accord, American Stock 
Exchange Company Guide, pp. 101-114. 
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an insider or anyone else is personally taking advantage of the information 
not yet released to the public; in addition, it is not aimed principally at 
protecting existing stockholders of a company, as distinguished from the 
investing public at large. Instead, this insistence on immediate full dis-
closure seems to rest on a kind of "integrity of the marketplace" footing, or, 
a right to know on the part of all of the investing community. Indeed, the 
SEC Release concludes with the observation that prompt disclosure of 
material corporate developments is necessary "so that investor confidence 
can be maintained in an orderly and effective securities market." 
On the other hand, there are some intimations in Release No. 5092 
which indicate that it may stem largely from Rule 10b-5. Thus the Release 
notes that unless the policy of providing adequate information is followed, 
a company may not be able to purchase its securities, and the insiders may 
not be able to trade its securities without running a serious risk of violating 
Rule 10b-5. The Release does not contain any suggestion that a failure to 
make the prompt disclosures called for would subject the company or its 
management to liability to market buyers or sellers even if the company and 
its insiders were not trading. Is that because Rule 10b-5 would not support 
liability in such a case? Not according to Professor Bromberg, who suggests 
in his article, "Disclosure Programs for Publicy Held Companies—A Practice 
Guide,"3 that there could be liability under the Rule in those circumstances. 
As he notes, the Texas Gulf Sulphur case held expressly that the company 
could be liable to market buyers and sellers for publishing misleading in-
formation even though the company was not itself dealing in its shares.4 
However, it must be noted that this does not reach the question of whether a 
company has an affirmative obligation to disclose current developments, 
such as the ore strike in Texas Gulf. Similarly, in most of the other cases 
cited by Professor Bromberg there had been some affirmative statements, 
which became misleading upon the failure to go on to disclose other per-
tinent information, thus bringing the situation squarely within clause (2) of 
Rule 10b-5, prohibiting any omission to state a material fact which is "neces-
sary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances 
under which they were made, not misleading." 
Of course, the line between simple nondisclosure, and a failure to dis-
close something which is needed to prevent what has already been said 
from being misleading, can be quite obscure. For example, Heit v. Weitzen,5 
one of the cases cited by Professor Bromberg, held that the publication of 
financial statements which did not disclose that substantial amounts of the 
corporation's income resulted from overcharging on government contracts 
constituted a violation of Rule 10b-5, for which market purchasers might 
recover against the corporation. While in a sense this might be viewed as 
3 Duke Law Journal (1970), pp. 1139, 1144. 
4 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F2d 833, 860 (2d Cir. 1968). 
5 402 F2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968). 
58 
"mere" nondisclosure of an independent fact—the overcharges on the gov-
ernment contracts—it is equally appropriate to regard the published financial 
statements as affirmatively misleading for lack of an offset to the reported 
income figure, and/or a contingent liability on the balance sheet. (Paren-
thetically, it might be noted that in making Rule 10b-5 applicable in this type 
of case, no one supposes that it will actually induce public revelations about 
overcharges; rather the hope is that the additional risk of liability under Rule 
10b-5 will lead to a cessation of overcharging.) 
In any event, the court in the Texas Gulf Sulphur case expressly dis-
avowed any unqualified obligation to publicize all material corporate develop-
ments immediately. Rather, the court specifically reserved the right of the 
corporation to refrain from publicizing information about the possible mineral 
strike long enough to allow the corporation to pursue its own interests by 
acquiring additional mineral rights in the area. As the court put it, "the 
timing of disclosure is a matter for the business judgment of the corporate 
officers entrusted with the management of the corporation within the affirma-
tive disclosure requirements promulgated by the exchanges and the SEC."6 
However, this was coupled with the warning that insiders, including the cor-
poration, must refrain from dealing personally in the company's stock, or 
revealing the information to outsiders, during any such period of nondis-
closure. (The aforementioned disclosure regulations of the Exchanges also 
recognize that a corporation may delay disclosure in order to serve some 
legitimate corporate interest, but they call for immediate disclosure in any 
event if widespread rumors develop or there is evidence of trading by insiders 
or tippees; SEC Release No. 5092 is silent on this.) 
Thus it appears that the fundamental theme of Rule 10b-5 (and of the 
Exchange disclosure regulations as well) is the prohibition against unfair 
advantage to insiders or their tippees, not the right of the stockholders, or the 
investing community at large, to have prompt access to all relevant infor-
mation. (It may also be noted that protection of existing shareholders is not 
an absolute. For example, take a case like Texas Gulf, where it is good news 
that is not disclosed promptly although this may serve the best interests of 
the corporation and hence indirectly the main body of the stockholders, it 
will certainly put at a disadvantage any existing stockholders who sell during 
the period of nondisclosure, while benefiting any outsiders who buy the stock 
during the period of the market rise when the information is finally made 
public. Thus the interests of selling stockholders, once the principal bene-
ficiaries of Rule 10b-5, are subordinated to those of the corporation, so long 
as no insiders are taking advantage of the undisclosed information.) Inci-
dentally, Professor Bromberg acknowledges also that the basic thrust of Rule 
10b-5 is toward fairness more than information as such. In his book, Securi-
ties Law: Fraud, he comments that the primary goal of the Rule is to promote 
fairness in securities transactions by limiting the trading of insiders with 
secret information and then goes on to criticize those commentators who 
6 401 F2d at 850, note 12. 
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"have lost this perspective and treated 10b-5 as though it were an absolute 
requirement for disclosure."7 
Without attempting to make any forecast for the moment, I would not be 
surprised to see Rule 10b-5 continue developing more in the direction of this 
semi-penal emphasis on barring unfair advantage than toward a broader 
recognition of a right to know (although, of course, these two themes are 
often quite parallel). To illustrate, suppose an employee of the Federal 
Reserve Board, overhearing a decision to change interest rates which will be 
announced shortly, goes into the market for his own account before the 
public disclosure. I suspect that the employee would be found liable under 
Rule 10b-5 to those with whom he dealt (if they could be traced), in order to 
discourage this kind of conduct, although no one has a right to know this 
information until the proper announcement. Compare this with a case in 
which a company like Texas Gulf has made a major discovery on which it is 
delaying disclosure for bona fide corporate reasons. If the company were to 
disclose this information in the interim on a confidential basis to a lending 
institution with which it was negotiating for a promptly needed loan, I doubt 
that there would be liability to anyone else under Rule 10b-5, despite a 
general right to information on the part of the investing community, because 
the limited disclosure was in pursuit of a proper corporate objective (although 
the company might be liable if the lending institution breached the confi-
dence and used the secret information in the market). Of course the situation 
would be different if the company were dealing with several lending institutions 
and made the disclosure to some but not all; that would be improper, just as 
it would be if the company made the disclosure to a few favored stockholders 
or prospective stockholders. That is because investors must be treated fairly 
vis-a-vis one another, and not, it would seem, because of a right to know on 
anyone's part. 
Nonfinancial Information 
Assuming that a distinction can be drawn between financial and non-
financial information, the case for a right to know about nonfinancial matters 
would seem to be even weaker than with regard to financial data, at least 
under the regulations of the SEC and the Exchanges, with their heavy 
emphasis upon the integrity of the market and protection of investors. And 
former Chairman Casey of the SEC is on record in several speeches as 
opposing any effort to move the Commission beyond its normal sphere of 
financial data and into a kind of indirect policing of social policies like 
environmental protection and civil rights. Nevertheless, there have been 
some developments on the borderline between social responsibility and 
financial information that may be instructive. In Sec. Act Release No. 5170 
(July 19, 1971), the Commission called attention to the fact that some of its 
requirements governing disclosure of legal proceedings and description of 
registrant's business might well "relate to material matters involving the 
7 1971, p. 275. 
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environment and civil rights"; in particular, the Release notes that disclosure 
is required when compliance with legislation relating to environmental quality 
may necessitate significant capital outlays, or materially affect the earning 
power of the business, or cause material changes in the business. In addition, 
a company must disclose any material legal proceedings arising under 
statutes relating to the protection of the environment, such as the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act and the Clear Air Act. Similarly, disclosure is 
required of any legal proceedings arising under civil rights legislation which 
might result in the cancellation of a government contract, or termination of 
further government business, or sanctions imposed for violation of the non-
discrimination rules of any federal regulatory agency. 
More recently, Sec. Act Release No. 5235 (February 16, 1972) promul-
gated proposed amendments to the Commission's registration and report 
forms designed to specify more precisely the disclosure required in Release 
No. 5170 relating to environmental matters. The proposed amendments are 
generally consistent with Release No. 5170, but they go somewhat further in 
(1) apparently requiring disclosure of any pending governmental proceed-
ings, whether or not material amounts are involved, and (2) calling for dis-
closure of any proceedings "known to be contemplated" by governmental 
authorities against the company. 
These proposed amendments have been sharply criticized by Mr. 
Hornbostel of the Financial Executives Institute, as well as by a spokesman 
for an American Bankers Association Securities Subcommittee. One of Mr. 
Hornbostel's objections is that requiring disclosure of the effect that environ-
mental compliance "may have" on capital expenditures, earnings and com-
petitive position would amount to requiring forecasting, at a time when the 
legal and accounting issues involved in publishing forecasts are still very 
much under study. He also contended that a company should not be re-
quired to "forecast" the actions of government authorities by attempting to 
report on proceedings against the company that were merely "contemplated" 
by such authorities. 
However these current SEC proposals work out, they are obviously well 
within the traditional financial framework. As is well known, much of the cur-
rent debate goes well beyond this, pressing strongly for a greatly heightened 
corporate recognition of social responsibility, and urging more disclosure in 
general and development of accounting techniques in particular to help 
dramatize these concerns and measure performance relating to them. Thus 
Professor Schwartz of Georgetown Law School, who was very active in 
"Campaign G M," notes in his article, "Corporate Responsibility in the Age 
of Aquarius,"8 that securities laws are supposed to be concerned with not 
only protection of investors but also "the public interest," and he finds a 
public interest "in learning of the social performance of public companies." 
He urges "a study of disclosure rules under the proxy and periodic reporting 
requirements to devise areas of inquiry about the public sector of a com-
8 The Business Lawyer, Vol. 26 (1970), p. 513. 
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pany's activities," and adds that "accounting rules could be examined for 
means for describing social costs which at present are not absorbed by the 
company." 
In a subsequent article,9 Professor Schwartz criticizes SEC Release No. 
5170 for taking "a needlessly narrow concept of the role of the SEC"; he 
contends that instead "the SEC should search for ways to define clearly what 
must be disclosed and to develop understandable requirements that a court 
can enforce, rather than look for reasons not to do so." He describes the 
potential advantages of such a broader disclosure requirement in these 
terms: 
Shareholders need pertinent information about the impact of cor-
porate decisions, and not just for the purpose of being able to 
decide whether earnings or stock prices will be affected. Rather, 
since the shareholders' position in management's election is what 
legitimizes management's power, shareholders should be able to 
make decisions on the basis of adequate information before they 
make themselves part of the process. Institutions that are con-
cerned with public welfare should be especially mindful of this 
relationship. 
There is also a great indirect value involved in the disclosure of 
this kind of information. Disclosure can work like a market mechan-
ism. The disclosure of unflattering information imposes a cost— 
the cost of embarrassment—which might quickly turn into the cost 
of consumer retaliation. To avoid paying that cost, companies 
would have to change the facts required to be disclosed should they 
be embarrassing. Thus, disclosure would lead to the employment 
of more blacks, the abatement of pollution, or the production of safe 
automobiles so as to avoid recall. 
But there is another side to the disclosure coin in the social responsi-
bility area, as Professor Ruder of Northwestern University, who is largely in 
philosophical agreement with Schwartz, noted.10 After arguing that public 
corporations should use their corporate power and assets to satisfy public 
obligations, he adds the following observations (without any express recog-
nition of how disquieting they may be): 
Since it is probable that in the short run the earnings and dividends 
of a corporation which recognizes public obligations will not be as 
great as are those of corporations which do not recognize such obli-
gations, management's decision to forego short run profits will prob-
ably be material to the average shareholder. Thus, a management 
policy determination to pursue public obligations may become a 
material fact which must be publicly disclosed. Failure to do so 
9 Georgetown Law Journal, Vol. 60 (1971), p. 57. 
10 University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 114, (1965), p. 209. 
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may give rise to liabilities for the company and for corporate man-
agement. 
Whatever the merits of Professor Schwartz's views, the important point 
in the immediate context is that he does not purport to rely upon any basic 
legal right to know doctrine; rather he looks principally to a broadened scope 
for Rule 10b-5 and other traditional disclosure weapons (sparked perhaps 
by allegedly enlightened self-interest on the part of stockholders). Indeed, 
speaking more generally there does not appear to be any authority for a 
legally-recognized right to know on the part of society about the affairs of 
publicly owned corporations simply because they are large and powerful and 
may have a very significant impact on substantial segments of the public. 
However, one commentator, Schoenbaum, does claim to detect some devel-
opment of a doctrine along this line: 
In recent years a new policy basis for corporate disclosure has 
emerged. Its scope is not yet clear and it has not yet received 
formal recognition in the law, but its significance cannot be under-
estimated. This is the idea . . . that disclosure has a role in regulat-
ing corporations as major power centers of our society. Acceptance 
of this wider role of disclosure to any degree is to say that there is a 
direct relationship between corporate disclosure under the securi-
ties laws and corporate responsibility. 
The novelty of this view should be emphasized. It would mean that 
disclosure is not merely investor-oriented but society-oriented. The 
efficient allocation of capital resources is secondary to the ethical 
and moral aspects of disclosure—and ethics and morality encom-
pass more than merely restraining overreaching by insiders. The 
heart of the problem is getting at the impact of corporate behavior 
on society, not only as to its financial affairs, but also in the areas 
of civil liberties, the environment, health, safety and consumer 
rights.11 
It is to be noted that even Professor Schoenbaum looks ultimately to the 
SEC to develop this as a viable, working doctrine. He decries the barrier 
imposed by the current SEC emphasis on disclosure as relating merely to 
investors and the investing community. He observes that it is already "com-
monplace for corporations to recognize that disclosure should relate to the 
social influences of the business and its responsibility to society" in their 
annual reports, and urges the Commission to fashion rules requiring and 
governing the inclusion of such information in the annual reports. These 
additional comments may also be of interest: 
. . . the addition of society-oriented disclosure rules to present 
Securities and Exchange Commission regulation need not involve a 
11 "The Relationship Between Corporate Disclosure and Corporate Responsibi l i ty," 
Fordham Law Review, Vol. 40 (1972), pp. 565, 578. 
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departure from the principle of profit maximization or require the 
acceptance of a totally new concept of corporate duty. It would 
merely be a recognition of the fact that the large corporation is not 
a private and autonomous institution, but is a community asset 
which is public in its conduct, its mores and its impacts. The basis 
of increased disclosure is simply that although a corporation exists 
to maximize profits, society has a right to be informed of the un-
deniable public impact of its actions. 
Greater corporate disclosure requirements would have two impor-
tant effects. First, corporate decisions which have a societal impact 
would be more open to public view. There would be increased de-
bate among the public and among the corporation's shareholders 
concerning many decisions. Shareholder and public opinion would 
act as a check on management and stimulate executives to higher 
ethical standards regarding public interest matters. . . . 
A second result of increased disclosure would be to expose those 
areas of corporate behavior which cannot be reformed internally, 
but which must be dealt with through government action and legis-
lation. The theory here is that disclosure is the least restrictive form 
of regulation in that it provides an incentive for self-reform. But 
there will be matters which can be corrected only through direct 
action by government. Disclosure would provide a basis for know-
ing when new laws are needed and, just as important, when they 
are not needed.12 
It remains to be seen whether these views will ultimately prevail. 
Just for the sake of completeness, let me add that Leonard Savoie's 
article with the inviting title of "The Public's Right to Know,"13 does not reach 
these newer developments, but rather is addressed principally to traditional 
financial information and the importance to the accounting profession of 
satisfying the public's desires and needs in this area. And in an interesting 
reverse twist on the right to know, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
has just decided, in Frankel v. SEC, that the Freedom of Information Act does 
not require the Commission to allow a private plaintiff to inspect and copy the 
Commission's investigatory files on Occidental Petroleum, which had been 
the subject of a suit by the SEC for violations of Rule 10b-5, terminating in 
a consent decree. 
Whose Statements Are They? 
This question has arisen in a variety of contexts in the Study Group's 
discussions. In one sense, it is not really a live issue at all at the moment; 
for it is almost universally stated or assumed that a company's financial state-
12 "The Relationship Between Corporate Disclosure and Corporate Responsibi l i ty," 
Fordham Law Review, Vol. 40 (1972), pp. 565, 578. 
13 Financial Executive, Vol. 36 (1968), p. 20. 
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ments are both representations of the management and the ultimate respon-
sibility of management. True, there may be some inconsistency between this 
view and the acknowledged power of the accounting profession to dictate 
the rules under which management must prepare " i ts " statements, but this 
role of the profession has long been viewed as fully justified because of the 
need to control the inherent self-interest of management in the results shown 
by the financial statements. 
Nevertheless, the question of whose statements they are may have 
special relevance in connection with the right to know issue, especially in 
relation to nonfinancial information. For even if corporate managements have 
become somewhat inured to the control exercised by the profession over 
how to report financial results in the traditional accounting statements, there 
might be a good deal more resistance to any effort by the profession to 
determine what information is to be reported. After all, if there is any sig-
nificance in the notion that the financial statements are management's, it 
might at least be taken to mean that the question of what the financial state-
ments are to report upon is a matter for management to decide. So there 
might be some force in an objection to pressure from the accounting pro-
fession for the addition of a whole new dimension to management reporting, 
such as societal data; and this would be especially true if the profession was 
not prepared to take a significant share of responsibility in connection with 
the new reporting. (Incidentally, similar observations might be made about 
pressure on management to publish its forecasts.) 
Before concluding, it is worth mentioning that research to date has 
turned up only one searching examination of the "whose statement" question 
on the merits, not surprisingly by Mr. Herbert Miller.14 Mr. Miller observes that 
although the statements are usually said to be management's, the constraints 
of generally accepted accounting principles and the rules of the SEC leave 
management with only limited control over " i ts" statements. Thus the state-
ments end up as "the product of mixed responsibility, of compromises, of 
successful and unsuccessful persuasion by the CPA, and of chain-reaction 
imitation of what has been done in some other set of financial statements." 
He concludes with the following observation: "It seems reasonable to expect 
that all interested parties, including management, would gain if the CPA 
more aggressively sought and assumed greater responsibility in connection 
with the financial statements with which he is identified." 
14 "Audi ted Statements—Are They Really Management 's?" Journal of Accountancy 
(October 1964), p. 43. An article by Frese and Mautz in the March-Apri l 1972 Harvard 
Business Review accepts the traditional view and urges that management should 
accordingly become more deeply involved in accounting policy issues. 
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